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397 
THE DOCUMENT AND THE DRAMA 
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By 
James E. Fleming.1 New York: Oxford University Press. 
2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth). 
Robert William Bennett2 
 Contemporary scholarly discourse on American 
constitutional law is fixated on the document. Particularly when 
the role of the courts is examined, the fixation is associated with 
what is likely the most quoted sentence in Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in Marbury v. Madison: “It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”3 
Marbury also explained that the Constitution is part of American 
law, and so this sentence articulating a judicial “duty” seems to 
suggest to scholars at least that courts have to dig deep to figure 
out just how that entire piece of “law” can be coherently 
“interpreted.” This fixation is perhaps apparent in the rush to 
embrace the label “originalism” by scholars espousing quite a 
variety of approaches to constitutional interpretation, including 
some “new” ones that disdain the force of all sorts of evidence 
about the “original” understanding of what the document would 
accomplish. The title of James Fleming’s new book makes a 
similar embrace quite explicit: “Fidelity to Our Imperfect 
Constitution.” Even beyond the courts, moreover, Fleming tells 
us in quite grand terms that the Constitution is to be understood 
as establishing “a framework or great outline for a self-governing 
people4 (p. 20).” 
 
 1. Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in 
Law, Boston University School of Law. 
 2. Nathaniel L. Nathanson Professor of Law Emeritus, Northwestern University 
School of Law. 
 3. 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 4. Fleming actually adverts to an appeal that originalism has on account of its 
“aspiration of fidelity” to the Constitution (p. xi).  
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There is an obvious awkwardness in this fixation with the 
document. Unlike scholars, federal courts emphatically refuse to 
grapple at large with what the Constitution is about. Thus they 
have long refused to issue “advisory opinions” about the 
Constitution (or any other elements of the law with which they 
deal). Instead, they interpret the document only in the service of 
dispute resolution, to resolve what the Constitution refers to as 
“cases” and “controversies.”5 And that seems to have been what 
Marshall had in mind as well. Immediately following the sentence 
quoted above, he explained why the courts have that “duty”: 
“Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule.”6 
Interpreting the document in resolving an ongoing succession 
of disputes substantially complicates the process of ascribing 
“meaning” to the document. Fleming is most certainly 
appreciative of complexity in interpreting the document. The 
subtitle of the book is “For Moral Readings and Against 
Originalisms,” and he does tell us that with appropriate “moral 
reading” of the Constitution, it embodies “abstract moral and 
political principles” (p. xi). But the “moral readings” (or, as he 
sometimes puts it, the “philosophic approach” (pp. xi, 3)) he has 
in mind also draw on information other than the text and abstract 
moral and political principles. Instead, “fit work” must be done 
(p. 137). Thus under Fleming’s notion of “moral reading,” “the 
best interpretation of the Constitution should [also] fit and justify 
the legal materials [available to the interpreter], including the 
text, original meaning, and precedents” (p. 99).7 
How to deal with precedent has roiled the originalism world, 
but Fleming’s embrace of a role for precedent is particularly 
intriguing—and a bit puzzling. The usual justification advanced 
for following precedent is the reliance that it may have generated.8 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
 7. At another point, Fleming writes approvingly of interpretation as taking account 
“of our constitutional text, history, and structure, together with our constitutional practice, 
tradition, and culture” (pp. 20-21). And at still another, quoting an earlier work, he puts it 
this way: “‘understand text, consensus, intentions, structures, and doctrines . . . as sites of 
philosophic reflection and choice about the best interpretation and construction of our 
constitutional commitments’” (p. 33).  
 8. See Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in 
ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A 
DEBATE 78, 115 (2011). 
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That justification is easy to appreciate if one thinks of 
constitutional interpretation in dispute resolution terms. For both 
parties to a dispute may at the time they interacted have had 
information about judicial precedents that dealt with earlier 
interactions bearing some similarity to the one they were 
contemplating. If one party may have taken note of the 
similarities and plausibly have relied upon the precedent, while 
the other party simply ignored it, that seems pretty compelling as 
an argument for the relying party when addressing the dispute 
between them, at least once—a la Fleming and most of the rest of 
us—a decisional role for precedent is understood as part of the 
process. 
To be sure, the contrast between the parties will not typically 
be so stark, and there might be occasions where palpable reliance 
on precedent might not seem sufficiently compelling to cause a 
court to favor the relying party. It might be, for instance, that the 
precedent was itself a distortion of some constitutional language. 
If that makes the relying party’s reliance seem “unreasonable,” 
that could be a justification for doubting its persuasive power. But 
that is to implement a “reasonable” version of the reliance 
justification, not to discard it. Or it might be that some gross 
injustice would result from following the precedent. That would 
also likely make the reliance unreasonable, but if not, there might 
then be an independent justification for refusing to follow the 
precedent. There could even be less strong a case than “gross 
injustice” that would persuade a court that it would be best to 
change the “law” represented by a precedent. And then there may 
be occasions to doubt that there was any reliance on precedent. 
The ways in which precedent filter through to people’s 
consciousness can be subtle, however, and hence confidence that 
there was no reliance on some precedent that seems relevant will 
not come easily. But in any event, the reliance-based justification 
for deference to precedent is readily apparent. For Fleming, 
however, following precedent is not valued—apparently not one 
whit—on account of reliance it may have stimulated. 
Instead, Fleming seems to see a role for precedent in making 
the larger interpretational enterprise more attractive. The title of 
his book acknowledges that the Constitution is “imperfect,” but 
Fleming’s “moral reading” approach is aimed at making the 
document the “best it can be” (p. 184). Just why it matters that the 
Constitution is to be made “the best it can be” is, however, left 
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unexplained. In particular Fleming pays no attention to the 
dispute resolution function to which both the document itself and 
Marshall’s justification for judicial review direct us. At one point 
I almost thought that Fleming would take the judicial dispute 
resolution task to heart, but then he let me down. In discussing 
why judges should not adopt “the mindset of a philosopher,” 
Fleming tells us that “[t]o begin with, judges have a job to do, a 
job they’re paid to do.” But then effectively all he tells us about 
that job is that it “involves fidelity to the law” (pp. 79, 80). 
The distinction between a focus on dispute resolution, on the 
one hand, and on a more detached search for what the 
Constitution is all about, on the other, is not a trivial one. And 
there is peril that lurks in the scholarly fixation with the 
document. For while, following Marshall, the Constitution is an 
important part of our law, it is not the same thing as the drama of 
one dispute resolving decision after another that is pursued in its 
name. 
Thus, for several reasons dispute resolution draws attention 
to the specific facts of those disputes. Most fundamentally, 
perhaps, the most general constitutional language will typically 
have been “originally” motivated by much more particularized 
problems. One obvious example is provided by sweeping 
generalities found in the Fourteenth Amendment. While the 
amendment nowhere mentions the problem of slavery, there is no 
doubt that those generalities were in large part responsive to the 
then looming questions of how the recently emancipated slave 
population was to be treated. As William Rehnquist once put it, 
“the Civil War Amendments . . . were enacted in response to 
practices that the lately seceded states engaged in to discriminate 
against and mistreat the newly emancipated freed men.”9 And 
those specific problems continue to affect dispute resolution 
decision making over time, in good part by generating arguments 
about similarities and differences between those animating 
problems and the disputes courts are called upon to resolve.10 
 
 9. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 
699 (1976). Terry Sandalow made much the same point: “Intentions do not exist in the 
abstract; they are forged in response to particular circumstances . . . .” Terrance Sandalow, 
Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1046 (1981).  
 10. Indeed over time the courts may even renounce an original intention or expected 
application of general constitutional language. Forbidding racial segregation of schools is 
sometimes cited as an example of such renunciation (pp. 4, 17).  
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To be sure, the contemporary dispute resolution reach of the 
general language of the Fourteenth Amendment extends well 
beyond problems of the newly freed slaves, none of whom are 
alive today. But how did that extension come about? Fleming is 
at times disdainful of “historical research to discover relatively 
specific original meanings” (p. xi), but in his extensive discussion 
of originalism(s), Fleming himself refers to “analogies” between 
those newly freed slaves and other groups that have more recently 
claimed protection under the Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause. African Americans who had never been enslaved are 
perhaps the most obviously analogous, but so, according to 
Fleming, are other groups to which the clause has been extended, 
like women, immigrants, and gays (pp. 58-60). I have no problem 
with seeing these other groups as “analogous,” though like 
Fleming I recognize that analogies draw on normative judgments. 
But analogies require both starting points and ending ones. In 
reaching contemporary problems by analogical reasoning, 
Fleming would seemingly employ original expected applications 
as starting points—and then, once the process gets going, later 
“applications” reached by earlier analogical steps. 
It is not only the historical origins of constitutional language 
where the influence of specificity is apparent. That influence is in 
fact pervasive in the dispute-resolution decisional process. The 
role of judicial precedent that we touched on above is actually a 
many-layered thing. Judicial precedents are sometimes invoked 
on account of the generalities the earlier courts articulated in 
explaining their decisions, but often they are invoked on account 
of their specific facts and analogies (or differences, for that 
matter) that might be drawn with the dispute under consideration. 
There are still other inputs into the dispute resolution process 
that draw attention to the factual details of disputes. Given the 
refusal to issue advisory opinions, no federal court has anything 
approaching sole control over the occasions when it opines on the 
Constitution. The trial courts, and even to a great extent 
intermediate appellate courts, must resolve all—and only—those 
disputes that litigants bring to them. To be sure, in more recent 
times at least, the Supreme Court has been able largely to pick 
and choose those disputes it will resolve from among a much 
larger number it is urged to consider. And no doubt its choices 
will sometimes be influenced by an inclination by one or more 
Justices to say something about the constitutional enterprise writ 
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large. But the disputes the Court does take on will still have been 
initiated by litigants. And those litigants seem largely to think that 
the specific facts of their cases can have a large effect on 
outcomes. 
This is no doubt because the facts presented in cases do 
influence the deciding courts. Some evidence of that influence is 
right out in the open as courts in the opinions they produce rely 
not only on general statements of law but on the specific facts the 
litigants have presented to them. The result is that litigants and 
lawyers considering the possibility of court resolution of some 
disputes will to one degree or another shape their factual 
situations to make them more appealing. The most extreme 
example of this is in class action and other “test case” litigation 
where appealing factual settings will be selected as vehicles for 
presenting more general claims. But even for litigants not so 
readily associated with similar unresolved claims, a great deal of 
effort is expended to present appealing facts to the deciding 
courts. 
With all these influences drawing courts’ attention to the 
specificities of the disputes they are called upon to resolve, what 
role does The Constitution play in the process? There is no simple 
answer to that question, particularly when the language of the 
document does not point directly to some result (and if it does, 
the dispute would likely not have been brought to court in the first 
place). And much of the constitutional language that is invoked 
in contemporary litigation—like “due process of law, “equal 
protection of the laws,” “unreasonable” searches and seizures, 
“cruel and unusual” punishments, and the like—provides scant 
direction in resolving disputes. We saw that Fleming himself 
recognizes that courts give heed to interpretational influences 
other than the language of the document. 
With constitutional interpretation by the courts understood 
as a means to dispute resolution, however, and with dispute 
resolution encouraging a role for specific facts of disputes, one 
might wonder just what the point is of insisting that courts should 
make the Constitution writ large the “best it can be.” I suppose it 
is hard to quarrel with making something better, including the 
Constitution. But the costs of any undertaking must also be taken 
into account. So one should ask whether the effort to make the 
Constitution its best might bring costs as the courts grapple with 
the disputes they are charged with resolving. To put the point 
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another way, the rampant uncertainty of what a “best it can be” 
Constitution would be like raises a question of whether the energy 
of courts should be spent on that task if it gets in the way of fair 
resolution of those disputes they are required to decide. Fleming’s 
take on precedent itself suggests that there may well be some 
dissonance in trying to combine the two tasks. 
But then again perhaps I misunderstand Fleming’s criteria 
for excellence, that “best” the Constitution can be. While there is 
some ambiguity in his presentation, I do not take the “moral 
readings” he favors to dictate a single approach. He clearly 
disfavors some contemporary moral readings (thus he tells us that 
the contemporary so-called “Tea Party” has “a deficient, unjust 
normative theory” (p. 107)), but he seems more generally to think 
that “moral reading” is an approach to interpretation, not a set of 
“right answers.”11 If that is so, then perhaps the constitutional 
“interpretation” he has in mind need not be aimed at a coherent 
account of the document writ large. Instead, perhaps Fleming 
would permit a moral reader addressing a particular dispute to 
focus on the constitutional language that seems most directly 
pertinent to the dispute and make that language into the “best it 
can be” for resolving that dispute, without concern for how the 
interpretation given that piece of language “fits” with the 
document as a whole. 
Such a dispute resolution focus need not lose sight of how the 
constitutional language it applies will be understood for future 
disputes. That is what the force of precedent dictates. Nor need 
the interpretation of the most directly relevant language ignore 
possible spillover effects for other constitutional language. 
Obvious examples are where identical or similar language appears 
more than once in the Constitution (“due process of law,” 
“privileges and immunities”), but there could well be spillover 
effects for constitutional language that wasn’t so obviously 
implicated by a given interpretation. But for (conceptually) 
remote parts of the document, the future dispute resolution reach 
of a decision would be of attenuated concern at best, so that the 
dispute resolution concern might stop well short of trying to make 
the document as a whole “the best it can be.” 
 
 11. Fleming does mention several recent Supreme Court decisions as “egregiously 
erroneous” (p. 167). But at the same time, he refers to the “big tent of the moral reading” 
(p. 161). 
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If Fleming would permit (dare I say, insist on) a judicial 
approach to “moral reading” that is concerned with the real world 
drama that occasions the judicial interpretational enterprise, then 
I would have no problem with his thesis. But I don’t read 
Fleming’s presentation to provide room for this sort of focused 
concern with the constitutional language that bears most directly 
on the dispute before the court. I think he would disparage such 
an approach to interpretation as giving in to misbegotten 
“pragmatic judgments,” instead of seeking “how best to elaborate 
the abstract moral and political principles to which the 
Constitution commits us” (p. 110).12 
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind, as Fleming 
does repeatedly emphasize, that dispute resolving courts are not 
the only actors who interpret the Constitution. Legislatures and 
executives (including administrative agencies) do so as well as 
part of their jobs, sometimes with pressures of dispute resolution, 
but sometimes not. Ordinary citizens can also grapple with 
constitutional interpretation, though count me as dubious that 
many of them do so with the aim of understanding “a great outline 
for a self-governing people.” But in any event a multitude of 
academic commentators like Fleming and others he discusses in 
the book take on the larger interpretational enterprise with relish. 
At one point, Fleming tells us that “[a] moral reading is not 
inherently court-loving” (p. 153). But Fleming does not 
acknowledge that different influences will operate on the various 
actors that may importantly shape their interpretational efforts. 
Indeed, he seems to want to assimilate the various 
interpretational efforts into a common enterprise. “Instead of 
judicial monopoly,” he tells us, he “embrace[s] departmentalism, 
that is, dividing yet sharing interpretive authority among courts, 
legislatures, executives, and the citizens” (p. 173).13 
To the extent that those other actors have the luxury of 
freedom from dispute resolution influences, it should not be 
surprising if they occasionally reach conclusions in some tension 
with those of the courts. I do not doubt that those other efforts—
most certainly including the scholarly ones—may occasionally 
 
 12. See also p. 111, where he puts emphasis on “coherence” and “integrity” in the 
interpretational enterprise.  
 13. In not mentioning scholars as a separate category—presumably lumping them 
with “the citizens” more generally—Fleming’s detachment from the real world of 
constitutional engagement comes through. 
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affect the judicial interpretational efforts. At the same time, there 
are influences in our larger system that keep the non-judicial 
actors from pursuing a host of disparate interpretational 
adventures, whether or not styled as “moral readings.” Since the 
courts are the most regular interpreters, our system seems to 
encourage deference by others to what the courts say about the 
Constitution. In that way, the judicial dispute resolution pressures 
of the constitutional law drama may influence efforts to interpret 
the document by all manner of interpreters. In any event, putting 
all the various interpretational efforts together as an all-hands-on-
board effort of “moral reading” focused on the document as a 
whole does not, I fear, greatly advance the cause of understanding 
what is going on. 
 
